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PANEL IV: THE PURSUIT OF
NATIONAL TAX POLICIES IN A
GLOBALIZED ENVIRONMENT
PRINCIPAL PAPERS
TRADE AND TAXATION
Paul R. McDaniel*
I. INTRODUCTION
The interaction of trade and taxation has been tense for
the past quarter century. Those responsible for government tax
policy, particularly in the United States, generally have ex-
pressed the view that trade agreements such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO) or the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) should not impact the tax system(s) of a
country; the interaction of tax systems should remain the sub-
ject of bilateral tax treaties. The European Union (EU), on the
other hand, has moved more aggressively to bring trade and
tax rules into closer harmonization. But the theoretical bases
for either view have not been expressly explored, so far as I am
aware.
1
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to establish in Part
II, the normative bases for tax policy and trade policy (both
* The author is a Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Tax and
International Tax Programs at New York University School of Law. A leading tax
scholar, Professor McDaniel, in collaboration with the late Professor Stanley Surrey
of Harvard, developed seminal work analyzing tax expenditures. He is the author
of three leading case books in U.S. taxation and, together with Hugh Ault, has
authored a leading treatise on international tax law entitled INTRODUCTION TO
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION. He also has compared different national
systems of taxation in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY. Professor McDaniel is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma and
Harvard Law School.
1. See Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Big Bucks, Cloudy Thinking: Constitutional
Challenges to State Taxes - Illumination from the GATT, 19 VA. TAX REV. 277
(1999) (addressing topics discussed in this article from a different perspective).
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unilateral and bilateral) and to assess whether there is any
inherent conflict between the two. Part III describes how tax
and trade policies in fact have intersected over the past 25
years through the WTO (and its General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) predecessor institutions) and the EU.2 Part
IV then provides a model under which normative tax and trade
polices both can be pursued and, at the same time, offending
provisions in a country's fiscal law can be subjected to agreed
upon trade rules.3
II. NORMATIE BASES FOR TAX AND TRADE POLICY
A. Taxation
A tax system must provide the answers to six questions:
1. What is the tax base?
2. What are the tax rates?
3. Who is to pay the tax (the taxable unit)?
4. When is the tax to be paid (accounting rules)?
5. How is the tax to be applied in cross-border transactions?
6. How is the tax to be administered?
It is important to understand that these are the only ques-
tions that must be addressed to establish a tax system. It is
not necessary to address other questions, such as how to pro-
vide financial incentives or cost-sharing subsidies for specific
economic or social activities. These questions may be raised,
but in the analytical model set forth above, they are extrane-
ous to the task of providing the structural elements required
for an operative tax system.
The following summarizes briefly the issues involved as a
country answers each of the above questions.
The Tax Base. The position taken here, and articulated in
greater detail elsewhere, is that there is a normative or bench-
mark structure for any global tax system.4 Thus, for an income
2. Since taxation is excluded from NAFTA, that agreement will not be con-
sidered. See Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free
Trade Zone, 49 TAX L. REV. 691 (1994).
3. This subject briefly was outlined by me in The Impact of Trade Agree-
ments on Tax Systems, in STAATEN UND STEUREN (Paul Kirchkof et al. eds., C.F.
MUller Verlag 2000) (a feschrift in honor of Professor Klaus Vogel).
4. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 186-87
(Harvard University Press 1985).
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tax, the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition (personal income
equals an individual's increase in net worth plus consumption
between two points in time) provides that structure. A con-
sumption tax falls on all expenditures for personal consump-
tion, either on an in rem or personal basis. Provisions in a
country's law that deviate from these normative or benchmark
structures are therefore to be analyzed as performing some other
governmental role--e.g., spending, regulation-but not as tax
rules.5 This point cannot be over-emphasized as it is crucial to
the conclusions reached in this paper on the relation between
tax systems and trade agreements. In this paper, I shall focus
exclusively on the income tax.
Tax Rates. Countries can choose any generally applicable
rate structure-progressive, proportional or even regressive.'
But suppose there are deviations for specified classes of tax-
payers or activity, e.g., foreign investors or investment in a
particular region of a country. In these cases, fiscal and trade
rules may come into conflict.
Taxable Unit. In the case of individuals, the issues are
whether to treat married couples as one or two taxpayers,
whether to treat children as part of the parents' taxable unit,
and so forth. In the case of corporations, the issues are wheth-
er to treat shareholders and corporations as separate taxpayers
or to adopt some generally applicable method of integrating
corporate and personal income taxes.' Countries may reach
different conclusions on these issues. Again, if the rules adopt-
ed create special treatment for selected classes of taxpayers,
there is a potential for conflict between fiscal and trade poli-
cies.
Accounting period. This question requires two responses.
First, the time period itself must be established as, for exam-
ple, one year. Second, rules must be provided to determine the
proper period to which an item of income or deduction is to be
assigned. Generally speaking, financial accounting standards
can be employed although some deviations may be required to
5. This methodology was applied by tax experts from six OECD countries in
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COmIPARATE STUDY (Paul R.
McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey eds., 1985).
6. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 4, at 191-92.
7. Id. at 190-191.
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simplify tax administration or protect the revenue.8 But devia-
tions may be provided to achieve other economic or social ob-
jectives and, once again, there is the potential for interaction
between fiscal and trade policies.
Cross Border Transactions. It is in this area that fiscal and
trade policies most often intersect. In general, a residence
country may choose one of three systems to apply to outbound
transactions: worldwide taxation of income with a credit for
foreign taxes paid; exemption of income derived outside the
residence country; or, worldwide taxation with a deduction for
foreign taxes paid.9 There generally are accepted approaches
for the application of any of these three methodologies, al-
though as to any one there may be technical differences be-
tween countries in implementing them. Each approach, gener-
ally applied, is consistent with a benchmark structure. But
countries, regardless of the approach adopted, often seek to
achieve other economic objectives, for example, increasing
exports. Obviously, in such situations the interactions of trade
and fiscal rules can create conflict.
Tax Administration. Rules are necessary to provide a
country with the ability to administer its tax system(s).'0 So
long as the rules apply uniformly to all taxpayers and are
transparent, no problems are created for trade. But if these
conditions are not met, interferences with trade rules are pos-
sible."
The statutory provisions and administrative actions that
implement the foregoing normative or benchmark structure of
a tax system are concerns of tax policy. We now turn to an
examination of the normative elements of trade policy in order
8. Id. at 188-90.
9. Id. at 192-93. For purposes of this paper, I adopt exclusive residence coun-
try taxation as the theoretically desirable approach although in practice, of course,
countries exercise extensive source-based taxation.
10. Id. at 193-94.
11. Cf. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL IssuE 28-30 (1998). Although the issues
raised by the OECD report obviously are related closely to those considered in this
paper, the OECD work will not be further analyzed. My interest is in formal
trade agreements; the work of the OECD goes well beyond trade. In addition, the
theoretical models for assessing the effects of tax competition are different from
trade theory. See John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX
J. 269 (1999).
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to assess the potential interactions between the tax system and
trade policy.
B. Trade Policy
The basic premise of free trade, advanced since the time of
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, is that the welfare of resi-
dents of all countries is enhanced if they can purchase goods
and services at their lowest prices on the world market. The
essential principle in this premise is that of comparative ad-
vantage. This principle in turn rests on the proposition that
countries differ in their ability to produce particular goods or
provide needed services. Thus, if a country specializes in pro-
ducing the good or providing the services which it can do more
efficiently than other countries, and trades those goods or
services for products of other countries, everyone's welfare is
enhanced. 2
Conversely, the welfare of all is reduced if the prices con-
sumers pay are distorted by governmentally mandated tariffs,
subsidies, taxes, regulations, import or export quotas, or other
administrative burdens." All of these techniques share a com-
mon feature: They differentiate between foreign and domestic
producers of goods or suppliers of services, e.g., by providing
subsidies to foreign producers not available to domestic ones,
by imposing barriers on foreign producers not imposed on do-
mestic producers, or by subsidizing exports. In the case of
subsidies, the economic benefit may be provided either by di-
rect governmental outlays or through provisions in its tax
system. Similarly, restrictions on proscribed activity can be
imposed by regulation or by provisions in its tax system.
The question then becomes, do normative free trade poli-
cies and normative income tax policies conflict?
12. For an accessible (to a non-economist) discussion of the principles sum-
marized in the text, see ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND EcoNoMIc RELATIONS
404-09 (Matthew Bender 1999). Some economists argue that the premise of free
trade is so strong, that a country can enhance the welfare of its own residence by
adopting a free trade policy even if other countries do not. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN
& MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 112 (2d
ed. 1991).
13. See Jagdish H. Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade, 25
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1993).
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C. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that, as a con-
ceptual matter, there is no inherent conflict between a norma-
tive income tax and optimal trade policy. From a unilateral
point of view, an accrual basis, full loss offset income tax, us-
ing an accepted form of treatment of cross-border transactions,
should not interfere with the free trade objectives of that coun-
try or its trading partners. It is not the provisions that imple-
ment a tax system that conflict with free trade objectives.
Rather, those provisions that are not necessary to implement a
tax system-subsidies or penalties--create problems for achiev-
ing free trade objectives.
This does not mean, however, that taxpayers and fiscal
authorities cannot encounter situations of double taxation or
non-taxation in cross-border transactions. The fact that coun-
tries can and do give different answers to the basic, or aspects
of the basic, questions means that potential non-neutralities
can exist even in a world in which no country sought to use its
tax system to encourage particular economic activity or subsi-
dize selected social concerns. 4 Thus, from a bilateral or multi-
lateral perspective, it is possible for two or more inconsistent
aspects of normative or benchmark income tax systems to
create distortions in the location and form of investment. In a
world of "perfect" income tax systems, then, coordination
among nations is required if these distortions are to be elimi-
nated. But, I believe that the following discussion will demon-
strate that these distortions are not those to which trade
agreements are directed.
We now turn to an analysis of actions taken by the WTO
(and its predecessor GATT institutions) and the EU with re-
spect to provisions included in a country's tax law. The objec-
tive is to see if these actions fit within a model that reconciles
these actions with a policy of non-interference in member
states' tax systems as a result of entering into a trade or com-
mon market agreement.
14. See H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the Interna-
tional Tax System, 53 TAX L. REv. 137 (2000) (arguing that these situations
should not be a matter of concern for fiscal authorities). For a counterview, see
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167 (2000). See also infra note
65.
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III. INTERACTION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS15 AND TAX REGIMES
A. WTO (GATT)
The pre-1985 version of GATT does not appear to have
been invoked frequently with respect to the tax rules of signa-
tory states. The notable exception is the challenge by the Euro-
pean Community and Canada to the U.S. Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation (DISC) regime.
Pursuant to GATT procedures, the GATT Council estab-
lished a panel of experts to consider the challenge to DISC.
The panel first concluded that DISC conferred a tax benefit
"essentially related to exports."" The Treasury aggressively
promoted the use of DISCs by U.S. corporations and it issued
annual reports showing that exports had increased as a result
of the DISC regime. This evidence made it rather easy for the
panel to conclude that DISC constituted an "export subsidy."'
The pre-1985 GATT applied only .to a remission of tax or an
exemption from tax. DISC, on the other hand, constituted tax
deferral as tax was imposed at the time DISC profits were
remitted to its parent corporation. However, tax deferral is the
equivalent of an interest-free loan. The lack of an interest
charge for the deferral, therefore, constituted a partial tax
exemption subject to GATT rules. This partial exemption (sub-
sidy) in turn benefitted the U.S. export sector by reducing
prices, increasing export sales efforts, and increasing profits for
items exported that qualified for DISC benefits. 8 Accordingly,
the panel ruled that the DISC regime violated U.S. obligations
under GATT. 9
As part of its defense, the U.S. filed a counterclaim, charg-
ing that the exemption system used by many European coun-
tries also violated GATT if the panel decided against the U.S.
15. There are differences between a free trade agreement such as NAFTA and
a common market such as the EU. See H.C-AW. SCHULZE, INTERNATIONAL TAX-
FREE TRADE ZONES AND FREE PORTS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THEIR PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICES (Butterworths 1997). For purposes of this discussion, however, I
use the term "trade" to include both types of agreements.
16. United States Tax Legislation, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.)
at 98, para. 67 (1977).
17. Id. para. 68.
18. Id. para. 72.
19. Id. paras. 73-74. The conclusion of the panel that the DISC provisions
constituted a subsidy was consistent with the inclusion of DISC in U.S. Tax Ex-
penditure accounts from its inception.
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on the DISC issue.2" The same GATT panel concluded the
French exemption of income from export sales likewise was a
subsidy under GATT. The key to this seemingly surprising
result was that France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were
applying their exemption systems to transactions that originat-
ed in their respective countries, not just to transactions that
took place wholly outside their countries. By virtue of this
treatment, the exemption provided a benefit for export sales
not available to domestic sales and, hence, constituted a par-
tial exemption from taxes for export income in violation of
GATT. The opinion of the panel, thus, was not to be read as
concluding that an exemption system as such, properly operat-
ed to apply only to transactions taking place outside the resi-
dence country, violated GATT.21 This was made clear in a
subsequent decision by the GATT Council affirming the earlier
panel's results but explicitly stating that a "pure" (my term)
exemption system did not of itself constitute an export subsi-
dy.2
2
The 1979 GATT Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Agree-
ment broadened the definition of tax related export subsidies
to include "the full or partial exemption, remission or deferral
[of tax] specifically related to exports."' The Agreement not-
ed, in relation to the DISC case, that tax deferral need not be
an export subsidy when an appropriate interest charge is im-
posed on the deferral.
The latter point is of interest as the U.S. Congress in 1984
moved to respond to the adverse decision on DISC. It retained
the DISC provisions but imposed an interest charge on the tax
deferral equal to the U.S. Treasury borrowing rate.' Presum-
20. See Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT
B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 114, para. 47 (1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained by
the Netherlands, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 136 (1977); Income
Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.)
at 127 (1977).
21. See A.R. Prest, GATT and Company Taxation, 1977 BRITISH TAX REV. 201.
22. See Tax Legislation, Dec. 7, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 114.
23. Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, art.
1(1)(a)(1)(2), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures].
24. I.R.C. § 995(f) (2000). No interest charge is imposed with respect to a
"small" DISC, a corporation with less than $10 million of export sales. I.R.C. §
1628 [Vol. XXVI:4
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ably, this action precluded further objection to the new DISC
regime.
At the same time, however, Congress instituted a new type
of foreign corporation, the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC).'
Space does not permit detailed explanation of the FSC rules.26
For our purposes, the important point is that the U.S. took the
view that an exemption from tax on export income would sur-
vive a GATT challenge if all the economic activities to produce
that income took place outside the U.S. Accordingly, a qualify-
ing FSC was required to carry out significant economic activi-
ties outside the U.S. If this and other conditions were satisfied,
part of the income of the FSC was exempt from U.S. tax."
Unfortunately for the U.S., the FSC legislation contained a
number of provisions that made it suspect under GATT:
a. The exemption granted to an FSC was a deviation
from the generally applicable U.S. system of worldwide taxa-
tion with foreign tax credit.
b. Despite the nominal requirement that economic pro-
cesses take place outside the U.S., by agency agreements the
FSC could have its U.S. parent or related subsidiary carry
out all the activities in the U.S. As a result, a FSC was sim-
ply a paper corporation typically organized in a tax haven
country.
c. In order to qualify for the exemption, no more than
50% of the fair market value of the exported property could
be attributable to articles imported into the U.S.; a "rule of
origin" in trade terms.
d. Special transfer pricing rules applied to transactions
between the U.S. parent and its FSC which deviated from
normal U.S. transfer pricing rules and were intended to max-
imize export sales profit in the FSC.
995(b)(1)(E) (2000). However, the EU has not seen fit to challenge this relatively
inconsequential provision. A subsidy element could be present in an interest
charge DISC if a company's borrowing rate were in excess of the U.S. Treasury
rate.
25. I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (2000).
26. See PAUL M. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 156-62 (4th rev. ed. 1998).
27. The amount exempted depended on the transfer pricing method adopted
by the taxpayer. In general, the so-called "23%" method exempted about 15% of
the combined taxable income of the U.S. parent and the FSC from qualified export
sales; if the "1.83%" method were used, about 30% of the combined taxable income
was exempt.
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Subsequently, however, new rounds of GATT created the
WTO and expanded significantly its scope with respect to taxa-
tion measures. The first step under the WTO processes is to
establish that a challenged provision is a "subsidy." The Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures defines the
term to include provisions pursuant to which "government
revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.,
fiscal incentives such as tax credits).' A "prohibited subsidy"
is one which is contingent on export performance or which
requires the use of domestic rather than imported goods, i.e.,
an export subsidy.29 In turn, the term "export subsidy" is de-
fined to include "full or partial exemption, remission or defer-
ral, specifically related to exports, of direct taxes,"" and the
allowance of "special deductions" directly related to exports or
export performance.3' To ensure that the special tax provi-
sions are readily identifiable by all signatory countries, each
country is required to submit by June 30 of each year a list of
the subsidies it employs and the list must identify the form the
subsidy takes, e.g., tax exemption. 2 In 1998, the EU asked
the WTO to investigate the validity under GATT of the U.S.
FSC rules described above.
Pursuant to WTO procedures, a dispute panel was created
to hear the dispute.33 The EU initially advanced two principal
bases to establish that the FSC rules constituted a "subsidy":
(1) the exemption from tax accorded the FSC and any distribu-
tions out of income qualifying for the exemption to its U.S.
parent; and (2) the derogation from normal U.S. pricing rules
28. See Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at art. 1(1)(a)(1)(2).
29. Id. at arts. 3(1)(a)-(b).
30. Id. at Annex 1E.
31. Id. at Annex IF. Tax subsidies for research and development are permit-
ted if specified conditions are met. Id. art. 8(2)(a).
32. Id. at art. 25(3). Countries have begun filing the required reports. See
U.S. Report to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
G/SCMIN/3/USA Supp. 1 (Nov. 19, 1998).
33. The U.S. raised several jurisdictional arguments that the WTO should not
be involved in resolving the dispute, among them a claim that the matter should
be resolved under existing bilateral tax treaties. Panel Report on U.S. Foreign
Sales Corporation Regime, WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) paras. 4.89-4.98, available at
http'/www.wto.org [hereinafter Panel Report on U.S. Foreign Sales]. Interestingly,
the EU responded that the "dispute is about a prohibited export subsidy and is
not a tax dispute." (emphasis added). The panel rejected the U.S. position. Id.
paras. 7.12-7.22.
1630 [Vol. XXVI:4
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for an FSC.' Since the FSC benefits were contingent on ex-
port performance, the EU argued they constituted a "prohibit-
ed subsidy." "
Somewhat surprisingly, in response, the U.S. raised as its
first argument the assertion that if the FSC regime were inval-
id under GATT, so were the exemption systems used by many
countries in the EU.36 It did concede the point made in Part 11
of this paper, that countries were free to adopt either a world-
wide system or a territorial system. But it then introduced the
logically fallacious argument that a country could have a "sys-
tem" that incorporates elements of both." The U.S. then went
on at considerable length to rebut the EU's two arguments
that the FSC regime-through its exemption and artificial
transfer pricing rules-constituted an export subsidy. Having
conceded that an exemption system is not an export subsidy,
the U.S. argued that since FSCs simply replicated exemption
systems they too did not constitute export subsidies."
In response, the EU seized upon the facts noted earlier
that the economic processes of a FSC all could be contracted
back to the U.S. and that the transfer pricing rules for an FSC
deviated from the normal U.S. rules to place a higher profit in
the exempt pocket of the FSC.39
It is not possible here to summarize the hundreds of pages
of argument and counter-argument between the EU and the
U.S., as well as interventions from third-party countries. In
the end, however, the panel ruled in favor of the EU and held
that the FSC regime constituted a prohibited export subsidy.
The panel concluded:
1. The FSC regime constituted a subsidy because it re-
sulted in revenue foregone, i.e., in examining the tax system
of the U.S., revenue was lost by virtue of the tax exemption
as compared to that it would have obtained under its general-
ly applicable regime for taxing income of foreign subsidiar-
ies.4
34. Id. paras. 4.268-4.290.
35. Id. paras. 4.229-4.308.
36. Id. para. 4.310.
37. Id. para. 4.320.
38. Id. paras. 4.351-4.448.
39. Panel Report on U.S. Foreign Sales, supra note 33, paras. 4.609, 4.610,
4.618-4.633.
40. Id. paras. 7.98-7.100.
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2. It was undisputed that the FSC scheme conferred a
benefit.4
3. The subsidy was contingent upon export performance
since only foreign trading income derived from export prop-
erty qualified.4'
Because its ruling on the exemption issue resolved the
dispute, the WTO panel did not address the EU's claims with
respect to the special transfer pricing rules available to an
FSC,43 nor its objection to the 50% domestic content require-
ment for a qualifying FSC.4
For purposes of this paper, the most telling sentences in
the panel report were the following:
[Tihe United States is free to maintain a world wide
system, a territorial tax system or any other system it sees
fit. This is not the business of the WTO. What it is not free to
do is to establish a regime of direct taxation, provide an ex-
emption from direct taxes specifically related to exports, and
then claim it is entitled to provide such an export subsidy
because it is necessary to eliminate a disadvantage to export-
ers created by the U.S. tax system itself. In our view, this is
no different from imposing a corporate tax of, say, 75 per
cent, and then arguing that a special tax rate of 25 per cent
for exporters is necessary because the generally applicable
corporate tax rates in other Members is only 25 per cent.45
In my view, the WTO panel got the matter exactly right, a
point to which we shall return in Part IV.
41
41. Id. para. 7.103.
42. Id. paras. 7.108-7.111.
43. Id. para. 7.127.
44. Id. paras. 7.131-7.132.
45. Panel Report on U.S. Foreign Sales, supra note 33, para. 7.122.
46. Although not directly relevant to this paper, some subsequent history is
interesting. The U.S. appealed the ruling of the panel to the WTO's Appellate
Body. That body affirmed the panel decision on February 24, 2000. Tax Analysts
2000 WTD 38-33, WESTLAW, Feb. 25, 2000. On April 7, 2000, the U.S. an-
nounced that it would accept the WTO ruling. Tax Analysts 2000 WTD 70-2,
WESTLAW, Apr. 11, 2000. The U.S. was given until October 1, 2000 to comply
with the WTO ruling (later extended to November 1 and then informally to No-
vember 17). Negotiations with the EU as to an acceptable substitute extended
through the summer of 2000, but no agreement was reached. Then, legislation
revising the FSC regime was introduced in Congress. See Staff of Joint Committee
on Taxation, Description of H.R. 4986, reprinted in FSC Repeal and Extraterritori-
al Income Exclusion Act of 2000, JCX-87-00 (July 27, 2000). On November 1, the
1632 [Vol. XXVI:4
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B. EU: State Aids and the Code of Conduct
Article 92(1) of the Treaty of Rome provides that "any aid
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competi-
tion by favoring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between member
states, be incompatible with the common market." '
The European Commission (EC) has taken the position
that special tax benefits fall within the quoted language.4"
According to the European Competition Commissioner Karel
Van Miert, state aid in the form of a special tax benefit is
subject to challenge if it meets four conditions: (1) beneficiaries
must gain an advantage; (2) the country must pay for the ad-
vantage; (3) competition and trade among EU member states
must be affected; and, most importantly, (4) the tax treatment
must benefit only certain companies or productions. 49
Senate passed H. Res. 4986 repealing the FSC provisions and enacting a new
"territorial" regime. See Staff of Joint Committee Technical Explanation of the
Senate Amendment to H.R. 4986, The "FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Exclusion
Act of 2000," JCX-111-00 (Nov. 1, 2000), reprinted in Tax Analysts 2000 WTD 214-
36, WESTLAW, Nov. 1, 2000. The House then adopted and passed the Senate bill
on November 14. See Tax Analysts 2000 WTD 221-1, WESTLAW, Nov. 14, 2000.
President Clinton signed the measure into law on November 15, 2000. The EU
rejected the new legislation, European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy
calling it "even worse" than the original FSC legislation. Tax Analysts 2000 WTD
226-9, LEXIS, Nov. 22, 2000. It is easy to understand the EU position. While
purporting to grant a general exemption for foreign income, income does not quali-
fy if it is not "qualifying foreign trade income." In addition, the agency rule that
allows all production processes to take place in the U.S. is retained as well as the
50% domestic content rule. Finally, the special transfer pricing rules are replaced
by special sourcing rules.
Accordingly, on November 17, 2000 the EU requested the WTO to authorize
up to $4.03 billion in trade sanctions against the U.S. For details of the EU re-
quest and an indicative list of U.S. products subject to sanction, see Tax Analysts
2000 WTD 226-33, LEXIS, Nov. 22, 2000. As expected the U.S. rejected the claim
for sanctions. See 89 TAX NOTES 1220 (Dec. 4, 2000). Final resolution of the issue
under WTO procedures was not expected until mid-2001.
Finally, the U.S. battle on behalf of the FSC was, in fact, an effort on
behalf of a very few large U.S. multinational companies. See Jose Oyola, Foreign
Sales Corporation Beneficiaries: A Profile, 2000 TAX NOTES INTL 157-40 (Aug. 11,
2000) (showing that the top 20 U.S. companies, ranked by the size of reported
FSC benefits in 1998, obtained 87% of the total FSC benefits in that year).
47. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 92, § 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
48. That view was upheld in early decisions by the European Court of Justice.
Case 70/72, Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 813; Case 173/73,
Italy v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 709.
49. See also Piergiorgio Valente & Franco Roccatagliata, Fiscal Aids: (In) Corn-
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Pursuant to its position, the EC has moved quite aggres-
sively to challenge special tax provisions that it believes con-
flict with Article 92(1) and its own tests interpreting that arti-
cle.5" In addition, in 1998, the EC adopted a formal set of
guidelines which, if violated, would make illegal all preferen-
tial tax provisions that adversely affect trade and competition
among EU states.5'
The focus of the guidelines is on "specific" tax advantages,
i.e., those that benefit certain enterprises or production activi-
ties. The EC includes as tax advantages such items as lower
rates of taxation, tax breaks, accelerated depreciation, or debt
cancellation. A tax advantage is "specific" if it is an exception
to its generally applicable tax rules or administrative practice.
Rules of general application are not state aids. But tax bene-
fits, if applied without discrimination, can be provided for
environmental protection, research and development, training,
and employment. In addition, even if a state aid is specific, it
may be granted an exemption if the country can justify it by
an economic rationale that makes the provision necessary to
the functioning and effectiveness of its tax system. A measure
found to be a prohibited state aid implemented without prior
EC approval or, if already enacted, must be repealed unless a
Treaty of Rome exemption applies, e.g., for environmental
protection or regional development.
The EC guidelines follow in many respects the approach
patibility with EU Rules, 17 TAx NOTES INT'L 206, 259 (July 27, 1998).
50. See id. at 262-265 for a description of some of the cases that had arisen
by mid-1998. One held prohibited by article 92(1) was a package granted by the
Basque Country in Spain to attract business including inter alia, a 20% corporate
or personal income tax credit; immediate depreciation of the assets used in a new
investment; and an additional 20% tax credit on technology investments. Id. at
262. See also 98 TAX NOTES INTL 143-4 (July 27, 1998) (EC agreement with Ire-
land to replace preferential provisions for certain trading activities with a general
12 V2% corporate rate). Later actions are reported at Tax Analysts, 2000 WTD
194-8 (Oct. 4, 2000), 2000 WTD 184-6 (Sept. 18, 2000), and Tax Analysts, 2000
WTD 217-18 (Nov. 25, 2000).
51. Commission Notice on the Application of State Aid Rules Relating to Di-
rect Business Taxation, 1998, O.J. (C 384) 3. The vigorous EC position on special
tax provisions as state aids is, potentially, a matter of considerable concern to
those countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union aspiring to join
the EU. Many of them employ substantial tax incentives for investment and ex-
porting. These issues are discussed in Alex Easson, Duty-Free Zones and Special
Economic Zones in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Tax
Analysts 98 TAX NOTES INT'L 26-19 (Feb. 9, 2000).
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developed in Part II.A., above. Thus, state aids do not include
tax measures that set the rate of taxation, depreciation rules
and rules on loss carry-overs, provisions to prevent double
taxation, and rules to prevent tax avoidance. The process to be
followed in identifying state aids is first to identify a country's
"common system." Exceptions or deviations from the system
then must be examined to see if they are justified by the "na-
ture or scheme of the tax system, that is to say, whether they
derive directly from the basic or guiding principle of the tax
system" of the country.52 If they do not, proscribed state aid is
involved. 3
The concept of "state aids" in the Treaty of Rome is con-
nected closely to the notion of "tax competition." "Tax competi-
tion" generally refers to the process by which countries seek to
gain an advantage in attracting investments and manufactur-
ing by reducing tax liabilities below those of countries compet-
ing for the same investment/manufacturing activities. If other
countries then retaliate by lowering their taxes, a "race to the
bottom" begins and all countries lose tax revenue.' The prob-
lems posed by tax competition are especially acute in a com-
mon market such as the EU: Distortions in location of invest-
ment and industrial activity are precisely what the common
market is intended to end. But, I assert that "tax competition"
is much better understood as "subsidy competition."
Thus, assume a two-country world in which Country A and
Country B start out with the same income tax bases and iden-
tical rates. To attract more investment, Country B reduces its
rates below that of A. A then may retaliate by reducing its
rates below the now lower rates of B, and so on. That is true
"tax competition," but it is not "harmful" tax competition. In-
deed, this point was recognized by the EC when it approved an
Irish 12.5% corporate tax rate of general application, though
that rate is far below that of most other EU countries.55
But of course, countries do introduce special provisions in
their income taxes to attract investment or increase exports, to
name two examples. After years of unsuccessfully prodding EU
52. Commission Notice, supra note 51.
53. Id. paras. 13-16.
54. "Tax competition' is discussed in greater detail in Alex Easson, Tax Com-
petition and Investment Incentives, 2 EC TAX J. 63 (1997).
55. See Tax Analysts 98 TAX NOTES INT'L 143-4 (July, 27, 1998).
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countries in the direction of "tax coordination" in their corpo-
rate income tax systems,56 in 1997 the EC shifted tactics and
terminology to attack the distortions caused by the utilization
of a preferential tax regime by member states. The EC pre-
pared a report recommending a "Code of Conduct" which EU
members would observe with respect to special tax mea-
sures." On December 1, 1997, the Council of the European
Union formally adopted the Code of Conduct.58
The Code of Conduct covers only business taxation. It is a
political rather than a legal document and is concerned with
measures which affect business location decisions within the
EU.59 The offending provisions identified as "potentially
harmful" are those which provide "a significantly lower effec-
tive level of taxation, including zero taxation than those levels
which generally apply.""
The Code of Conduct sets forth a non-exclusive list of fac-
tors to be considered in assessing whether the prohibited level
of tax has been violated by a particular provision:
a. Whether special tax measures are open only to non-
residents or transactions with nonresidents;
b. Whether the tax base is affected by the measure (ring-
fencing);
c. Whether the absence of economic activity precludes
the granting of the tax benefits (i.e., can a tax benefit be
56. See Paul R. McDaniel, Personal Income Taxes: The Treatment of Tax Ex-
penditures, in TAX COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Sijbren Cnossen
ed., 1987).
57. Communications from the Commission to the Council, Toward Tax Coordi-
nation in the European Union: A Package to Handle Harmful Tax Competition,
COM(97)495 (Jan. 10, 1997).
58. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on Dec. 1, 1997, 1998 O.J. (C
211) at 1 [hereinafter Conduct]. The Code is set forth in Annex 1 to the Conclu-
sions. The Council is made up of government representatives from each country in
the EU. See infra Part V for a discussion of the difference between the tax coordi-
nation and the tax competition approaches.
59. See Conduct, supra note 58, para. A. The focus on locational distortions
may have procedural implications. Normally, EU legislation in the field of taxation
requires a unanimous vote of the member states. See Treaty of Rome, supra note
47, at art. 101. But, measures designed to eliminate distortions can be adopted by
a majority of the Council. See Treaty of Rome, at art. 101. See also Anno Rainer,
European Commission Presents Draft Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, Tax
Analysts, 97 TAX NOTES INT'L 198-10 (Oct. 14, 1997).
60. See Conduct, supra note 58, at para. B. The reduced level of taxation may
result from the normal tax rate, the tax base or any other relevant factor (empha-
sis added).
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obtained even if no economic activity takes place in the coun-
try?);
d. Whether intercompany profit determinations deviate
from OECD transfer pricing principles; and,
e. Whether administrative procedures to take advantage
of the measure lack transparency."1
There obviously is a close connection between state aids
under the Treaty of Rome and the harmful tax competition
proscribed by the Code of Conduct. The Commission Notice on
the state aids rules, discussed above, declares that a tax mea-
sure determined to be harmful under the Code does not neces-
sarily determine that it is state aid under the Treaty. Howev-
er, the application of the Code is a relevant factor in making
the state aids determination.62
IV. SYNTHESIS
The WTO panel in the FSC case, the concept of prohibited
state aids under the Treaty of Rome, and the Code of Conduct
all use different language to describe and identify provisions in
a member country's tax system that are proscribed by the
relevant treaties. I believe, however, it is clear that the ap-
proaches of all three are consistent with the proposition assert-
ed in Part I.C. The rules that form part of the normative or
benchmark system of taxation do not conflict with, and are not
even covered by, the trade agreements.
Of course, countries adopt numerous provisions that are
not responsive to or necessary for the implementation of a
normative tax system. These provisions are the equivalent of
government spending programs, and it has been recognized for
over 30 years that they must be analyzed as such. The termi-
nology employed by a number of OECD countries is "tax expen-
61. For a discussion of these factors, see Jacques Malherbe, Special Report,
Tax Analysts, 2000 WTD 132-17, July 10, 2000. A Code of Conduct (business taxa-
tion) group headed by U.K. Paymaster Dawn Primarolo in May and December
1999, issued interim reports identifying some 285 tax measures that should be
investigated under the Code of Conduct principles. Subsequently, the group re-
duced the December 1999 number to 66. See 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 1283 (Mar. 20,
2000). Reported examples of the group's actions may be found at 19 TAX NOTEs
INTL 1777 (May 3, 1999), and on the Tax Analysts electronic source at 1999 WTD
1-17, 131-7, 131-8, 201-5, and 220-3.
62. See Treaty of Rome, para. 30.
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ditures," denoting that a spending (or regulatory) program is
being run through a tax system rather than through the direct
spending budget (or administrative rules). It is these types of
provisions to which trade agreements can and must apply.'
Indeed, tax expenditure language and analysis were put
forth specifically by the EU in the WTO FSC case. The refer-
ence arose in connection with the issue as to whether there
was "revenue foregone" within the meaning of the GATT."
Here, the EU pointed expressly to the U.S. tax expenditure
accounts, to the U.S. methodology for identifying tax expendi-
tures, to the fact that the FSC regime is listed as a tax expen-
diture in U.S. accounts, and to the methodology used to deter-
mine the costs of tax expenditures, i.e., the revenue foregone
method.'
While neither of the WTO agreements, the Code of Con-
duct, or the interpretation of State Iaid employ the term "tax
expenditure," it is clear that provisions found to fall within the
varying language of those documents all would constitute "tax
expenditures" as the concept is employed by the U.S. and other
OECD countries. This in turn leads to the following description
of the principles regarding the interaction of trade agreements
and tax systems:
1. The provisions of a country's tax system that comprise
the normative or benchmark structure of a tax should be
outside the scope of trade agreements and procedures. These
provisions are the real "tax" rules of a country and are not
substitutes for direct subsidy programs."
2. Subsidies provided through a tax system (tax expendi-
tures, state aids, harmful tax competition, or special exemp-
tions) should be subject to scrutiny under trade agreements
just as are direct subsidies affecting trade or competition.
Subsidies cannot be removed from the scrutiny of trade
63. For descriptions of tax expenditures employed by eleven OECD countries,
see Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, TAX EXPENDITURES-
RECENT EXPERIENCES (1996).
64. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.AS 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
65. See Panel Report on U.S. Foreign Sales, supra note 33, paras. 4.596-4.601.
66. Of course, the tax rules can and do distort the free movement of capital
and, by extension, trade. Trade agreements typically do not cover capital flows;
instead, mitigation of income tax-induced barriers to the free flow of capital is left
to the bilateral tax treaty process.
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agreements just because they are provided through (non-) tax
rules.
The actions to date of the WTO and the EU are consistent
with these principles.
V. POST-SCRIPT
It is appropriate to say a word about the distinction be-
tween "tax competition" and "tax coordination" as those notions
have developed in the EU context. The exposition of tax coordi-
nation in the EU reached its zenith with the publication of the
Ruding Committee Report in 1992.7 That Report, and its con-
cept of tax coordination (in fact, the harmonization of the cor-
porate tax systems of all EU countries), was not accepted by
EU member states. In 1997, the EC shifted to the notion of
harmful tax competition. Are there practical differences in the
two approaches? An example may shed light on the question.
Assume that all countries in the EU, except France, adopt-
ed straight-line depreciation as their general depreciation rule.
Assume that France adopted, as its general provision, the
immediate deduction of all costs of investment in tangible
assets. The rule applied both to investment by French inves-
tors and to investment by foreign investors. The French action
clearly would violate a Ruding Committee tax coordination
approach. But it apparently would not violate the harmful tax
competition approach embodied in the Code of Conduct because
it would not be a "specific" provision and it would not discrimi-
nate in favor of foreign investors.
But, to continue the above hypothetical, assume a U.S.
company is deciding whether to invest in France or another
EU country. All other things being equal, the U.S. company
clearly will decide to invest in France. Yet, this is precisely the
kind of locational distortion which the Code of Conduct ostensi-
bly addresses. Why would the EU accept this result? The an-
swer probably lies in practicality rather than theory. Note that
in order for France to attract foreign investors, it must forego
the revenue from all of its domestic investment. This is a trade
67. See Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Committee of
Independent Experts on Company Taxation (1992), at http//www.europarl.eu.intl
expertslsen.htm.
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off the major EU countries are unlikely to accept.
But suppose the EU country adopting immediate deduction
is one which has very little domestic investment to begin with
(and there are several of them). Adoption of the "general" rule
now has the effect, but not the form, of a "specific provision" to
attract foreign direct investment. How is the EU to proceed in
such a case?
One way, of course, is the tax coordination route, but that
approach did not fare well in the 1980s and 1990s. Another, is
to adopt the approach outlined in Part I.A. There, I suggested
that classification of a provision as a "tax" or as a "subsidy"
measure be determined by testing it against a normative or
benchmark structure.' Such an approach, applied in the
above example, would classify the accelerated portion of
France's cost recovery system as a "special" provision and sub-
ject to the Code of Conduct rules.
It is true that many, perhaps most, items are relatively
easy to classify as subsidies under both the current EC and the
normative or benchmark approaches. Nonetheless, it seems
likely that at some point the EC is going to need to make ref-
erence to a norm that exists independently of a country's exist-
ing tax legislation.
68. See SURREY & MCDANrEL, supra note 4, at 2-6, 184-194 (detailing this
methodology).
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